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Recent Cases
AUTOMOBILEs-LIABILITY OF USED CAR DEALER FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE CONDITION OF USED CAR IN COURSE OF DEMONSTRATION

Standard Oil Company v. Leaverton:Defendants, engaged in the business of buying and selling used and wrecked
automobiles, auto parts and salvage metal, delivered a used car to a prospective
customer for the purpose of trying it out with the view of purchasing the automobile from' the defendants. The customer, Williams, paid the defendants $60 as
a deposit either to be returned to Williams if the automobile was not purchased
by him, or applied on the purchase price if he did purchase it. While driving the
automobile the following day, Williams collided with and damaged plaintiff's gasoline pumps. The accident was found to be caused by defective brakes on the
automobile. The Kansas City Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's judgment sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action
and held that the fact that the automobile was not offered as a new automobile
or one which had been reconditioned, or the fact that defendants and their customer all knew it was a used automobile would not relieve the defendants of their
duty to the plaintiff and other third parties.
The court bases its holding on the reasoning in Vaughn v. Millington Motor
Co.,2 where the court recognized that while automobiles and motor trucks are not
per se dangerous instrumentalities, they may become so when used at places and
in a manner calculated to do injury. Hence the necessity for the rule that one
who lets an automobile or motortruck for use on public highways owes the duty of
exercising ordinary care to avoid putting forth a machine with defects likely
to cause injury to persons who come in contact with it. The court sets forth
the modern concept of liability for negligence when it states that this study does
not rest upon the contract of bailment, but arises from the obligation which the
law imposes upon every man to refrain from acts of omission or commission which
we may reasonably expect would result in injury to a third person. It follows that
if the bailor knows, or by reasonable diligence could know, of defects in devices
intended to control them an obligation rests upon him not to let the machine without correcting the defects, or, in the usual situation, without notifying the bailee
of the defective condition and the need to make the machine safe before using it in
public. This is the modern common law doctrine of negligence which was first
applied in the bailment cases and subsequently extended to the manufactureer
1. 192 S. W. (2d) 681 (Mo. 1946) K. C. C. A.
2. 160 Tenn. 197, 201, 22 S. W. (2d) 226, 227 (1929)
(57)
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cases. 3 Later it was adopted to extend liability to rent-a-car dealers for injuries
4
to third persons caused by automobiles let in defective condition.
The liability of a seller of an article not inherently dangerous, but made
dangerous by defective conditions present at the time of sale, for an injury to a
third person raises a different question from that presented where the injury is to
the buyer himself. In the latter case, there is privity of contract between the seller and buyer, whereas in the former case such privity of contract does not exist.
In either case liability may be predicated upon the breach" of a common law duty
which the seller of the article owes to anyone whom he has reason to believe will come
in contact with it, where he knows, or by the exercise of ordinary diligence should
know, that the article he is delivering is in an immenently dangerous condition. In
such cases he is liable to any person, or class of persons, he has reason to believe
will come into contact with the article, and who suffers injury because of its defective and dangerous condition. While the cases are not in accord upon this
doctrine, the trend of the later decisions is to sustain the liability.
The Missouri court cites but three cases to support its decision, all of which
involve the letting for hire of automobiles and trucks. There seems to be no logical reason to limit the doctrine to those particular facts. Certainly the same
social considerations that impose a duty upon the manufacture and the bailor for
hire should impose a similar duty upon one who sells a used car for use upon the
highway.5
3. Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Co., 261 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919), 8 A. L. R.
1023 (1920); Bird v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F. Supp. 590 (W. D. N. Y. 1936): Rotch-e
v. Buick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 507, 193 N. E. 529 (1934), reversing 267 Ill. App. 68
(1932); Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S. IV. 1047 (1911),
37 L. R. A. (n. s.) 560 (1912); Krahn v. J. L. Owens Co., 125 Minn. 33, 145 N.
W. 626, 51 L. R. A. (n. s.) 650 (1914); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 160 App.
Div. 55, 145 N. Y. Supp. 462 (3d Dep't 1914), aff'd in 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E.
1050, L. R. A. 1916F 696 (1916); Quackenbush v. Motor Co., 167 App. Div.
433, 153 N. Y. Supp. 131 (3d Dep't 1915); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash.
456, 12 P. (2d 409 (1932), 88 A. L. R. 521 (1934); see Flieq v. Brothers Buick
Co., 196 Wisc. 196, 218 N. W. 855 (1928), 60 A. L. R. 357 (1929), involving the
liability of a dealer in second hand autos to a third person for injuries caused by the
defective brakes on an auto which the dealer had reconditioned and sold -upon
the representation that it was properly equipped; RESTATEMENT, ToitTs (1934),
sec. 395.
4. Charles System v. Juliano, 66 F. (2d) 931, 62 App. D. C. 283 (1933),
Saunders System Birmingham Co. v. Adams, 217 Ala. 621, 117 So. 72 (1928),
61 A. L. R. 1333 (1929); Sears v. Interurban Transportation Co., 14 La. App. 343,
125 So. 748 (1930); Mitchell v. Lonergan, 285 Mass. 266, 189 N. E. 39 (1934);
Milestone System v. Gasior, 160 Md. 131, 152 At. 810 (1931); Ferraro v. Taylor,
265 N. W. 829 (Minn. 1936); Spelky v. Kissell Skiles Co., 54 S. W. (2d) 761
(M& 1932); McWilliams v. Griffin, 273 N. W. 20 9(Neb 1937), 110 A. L. R.
1039 (1938); O'Brien v. Hendrick Hudson Garage, 250 App. Div. 650, 295 N. Y.
Supp. 686 (3d Dep't 1937); Trusty v. Patterson, 299 Pa. 469. 149 At. 717 (1930);
Collette v. Page, 44 R. I. 26, 114 Atl. 136 (1921), 18 A. L. R. 74 (1922); Vaughn
v. Millington Motor Co., 160 Tenn. 197. 22 S. W. (2d) 226 (1929); City of Corpus
Christi v. Texas Driverless Co., 190 S. W. (2d) 484 (Tex. 1945).
5. The writer has found but one reported case where the problem has arisen
under facts somewhat similar to those of the principal case, and there the case
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The development of the common law doctrine of negligence applied here had
its beginning with the exceptions to Winterbottom v. Wright.0 The English court
there held that in the absence of privity of contract the manufacturer of a chattel
was not liable to persons injured by its negligent construction. With the changing
social conditions brought on by the growth of industry in the United States and
England certain exceptions were adopted by the courts: 7 (1) where the seller
knew the chattel was dangerous for its intended use and failed to disclose that
fact to the buyer, he became liable to third persons injured by such use; s (2)
where the chattel furnished was furnished for use in the vendor's business on his
premises-treating the user as a business visitor;9 (3) where the article is inherently dangerous in itself.' 0 Justice Cardozo set out the modern doctrine in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,- holding the manufacturer liable for injury to persons
other than the vendee if the manufacturer knew or should have reasonably forseen
that, unless he used care, serious injury might occur to those who use or come in
contact with the chattel.
The MacPherson case has been followed in many jurisdictions,12 and rejected in others,"3 but most of the modern text writers have endorsed it. 14 While

was disposed of upon another ground. Sandlin v. Hamilton Auto Sales Co., 49 Ohio
App. 313, 197 N. E. 238 (1934).
The presiding judge (dissenting) states the
law as adopted by the Missouri court in the principal case.
6. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Repr. 402 (1842).
7. PROSSER ON TORTS (1941) 675.
8. Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 213 N. C. 775, 197 S. E. 757 (1938).
9. Bright v. Barnett & Record Co., 88 Wise. 299, 60 N. W. 418 (1894), 26
L.-R. A. 524 (1910); Heaven v. Pender 11 Q. B. D. 503 (1883).
10. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865, 61 L. R. A.
303 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903); Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 10 S. E. 118
(1889); Roberts v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn., 211 Mass. 449, 98 N. E. 95
(1912); Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S. W. 80 (1915).
11. 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
It may be interesting to note
that the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright supra, note 6, relied upon in the
dissenting opinion in the MacPherson case has been repudiated in England
'by Donaghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 562, in which the majority opinion of
Cardozo, J. in the MacPh'erson case was approved and followed.
12. Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930); Johnson
v. Cadillac Motor Co., 194 Fed. 497 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1912), rev'd in 261 Fed.
878 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919), 8 A. L. R. 1028 (1920), citing MacPherson v. Buick Mot6r
Co. as an authority for reversed; Heckel v. Ford Motor Co., 101 N. J. L. 385, 128
At. 242, 39 A. L. R. 989 (1925); Cohen v. Brockway Motor Truck Corp. 268
N. Y. Supp. 545, 240 App. Div. 18 (1st Dep't 1934); Marsh Wood Products Co.
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wise. 209, 240 N. W. 392 (1932); cf. Foster v.
Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 Pac. 945 (1926), recovery denied because
plaintiff had warning of danger from the book of instructions and from the nature
,of the machine.
13. Osheroff v. Rhodes-Burford Co., 203 Ky. 408, 262 S. W. 583 (1924).
14. Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their I'minediate Vendees (1929) 45 L. Q. REv. 343, 353; HARPER, ToRTs (1933) 246;
BURDICK, TORTS (1926) 544; HUDDY ON AUTOMOBILES (1916, Sec. 210; 7 BLASHFIELD'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE. (Perm. Ed.) § 4811; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 265.
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the earlier Missouri decisions were based on exceptions to the rule of Winterbottorn
v. Wright,15 our supreme court approved the doctrine of the MacPherson Case in
McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co."0
It might be argued that the manufacturer's liability should be distinguished on
the ground that his negligence is affirmative where he has installed defective parts
or materials in an automobile which, when put to its contemplated use, will be
dangerous to life, limb, or property of the user or those in which he comes in contact.
On the other hand the used car dealer has done nothing; his negligence, if it is
negligence at all, takes a passive form. However the same policy which brought
about the adoption of the doctrine in the manufacturer cases should be applied to
the used car case. No hardship is placed upon the used car dealer because the duty
in his case is limited to that of reasonable inspection.17 The fact that the dealer's
negligence takes the form of inaction does not alter the fact that he has allowed
a dangerous instrumentality to be driven upon the highway. A condition imminently
dangerous to life and limb can be caused by negligent omission and failure to inspect
as well as the negligent installation of a defective part.
It should be part of the calculated risk of the business man to assume responsibility for the reasonable inspection of the products he offers for sale. The public
has come to rely upon the vendor's profession of competence. Should the fact that
defendant is a dealer in used cars place him beyond the pale of the law which is so
rigidly applied to manufacturers and vendors of other products? Who else better
than he is in a position to know or become aware of defects latent or patent in the
automobile he offers for sale?
The principal case is an interesting extension of the principle laid down in the
MacPhersoncase in that it makes the negligent used car dealer liable to third persons
for loss to property. The court, in refusing to limit the liability to personal injuries,
reasons that negligent injury to property is asactionable as negligent injury to
persons. The fact that the point was not brought up by the defendant in the principal case shows that once we recognize the policy of placing risks on the used car
dealer, the vendor, and the bailor, who can best remedy the danger, there is no
15. Wright v. Holland Furnace Co., 186 Minn. 265, 243 N. W. 387 (1932);
Mazzetti v. Armour, 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913); Bohlen, slipra note 14.
16. 318 Mo. 397, 1 S. W. (2d) 122 (1927). Although the McLeod Case
was couched in terms of an extension to exception one mentioned in Husett v. J. I.
Case Threshing Machine Co., supra note 10, subsequent cases in Missouri have
cited it as establishing the modern doctrine in this state. Gibbs v. General Motors
Corp., 166 S. W. (2d) 575 (Mo. 1942), McCormick v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods C. 144 S. W. (2d) 866 (Mo. App. 1940); Tayer v. York Ice Machinery
Corp., 342 Mo. 912, 119 S. W. (2d) 240, 117 A. L. R. 1414 (1938); Shroder v,
Barron-Dady Motor Co., 111 S. W. (2d) 66 (Mo. 1937).
17. "We intend only to hold that he (the dealer) must exercise reasonable
diligence to know the condition of his machines before letting them into the hands
of drivers for use on the highways. He must in that regard exercise such simple
and available tests as the intended use would suggest to sensible and right
minded persons-the jury being at last the judges." Saunders System Birmingham Co. v. Adams, 217 Ala. 621, 117 So. 72 (1928) 61 A. L. R. 1333 (1929).
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apparent reason for going half way and limiting the liability to personal injury.
While some courts have been reluctant to apply the doctrine of the MacPherson
case to'cases involving property, there is no logical reason for so differentiating.18
The rule proceeds on the theory that the dealer has breached a duty to those within
the area of its use, and the nature of the resultant damage is immaterial."
GEORGE W. HARLAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL LIBERTIES-RIGHT OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES TO
DISTRIBUTE RELIGIOUS LITERATURE UPON STREET OF COMPANY TowN

Marsk v. Alabama"
Appellant, a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, was convicted of violation of a
statute of the State of Alabama 2 which provided that it should be a criminal offense
to enter or remain upon the premises of another after having been ordered not to
do so. She attempted to distribute religious literature upon a sidewalk in the business
district of a company-owned town. The company had posted notices in various
stores to the effect that no street or house vendors would be permitted to carry on
their businesses in the town without written permission. Appellant was told that she
could not distribute literature without a permit and that none would be issued to

18. Wright v. Holland Furnace Co., 243 N. W. 387 (Minn. 1932); Ellis V.
Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 225 N. W. 395 (1929); Quackenbush v. Ford Motor
Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N. Y. Supp. 131 (3d Dep't 1915); Mazzetti v. Armour
& Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633, 48 L. R. A. (n. s.) 213 (1913); Anglo-Celtic
Shipping Co. v. Elliott & Jeffery (1926) 42 T. L. R. 297.
19. In Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 18, the court discussed
the problem where it was asked to hold that a different rule is involved in the
case of injury to the property of a third person. The court held that the manufacturer's duty is made to depend, not upon the inherent danger of the automobile which he places on the public highway, but upon the result of the accident which grows out of his faults of construction. The court said that in such
cases the negligence is based upon the failure to perform a duty owed to all persons in whose presence the machine is to be used, not upon a duty to the purchaser
only, and the .particular class of injury which may result has no bearing upon the
question of liability. Having disregarded this duty to the public in general, including the purchaser, the manufacturer is liable for the injury growing out of such
negligence, whether such injury be to the person or the property of the purchaser,
although the vehicle was not purchased directly from the manufactuer, but from
an agent to whom it was sold.
1. 90 L. Ed. 227, 66 Sup. Ct 276 (1946).
2. "Any person who, without legal cause or good excuse, enters into the
dwelling house or on the premises of another, after having been warned, within
six months preceding, not to do so; or any person, who, having entered into the
dwelling without having been warned within six months not to do so, and fails or
refuses, without legal cause or good excuse, to leave immediately on being ordered
or requested to do so by the person in possession, his agent or representative, shall,
on conviction, be fined not more than one hundred dollars, and may also be imprisoned in the county jail, or sentenced to hard labor for the county, for not more
than three months." ALABAMA CODE 1940, Title 14, Section 426.
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her. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Alabama statute was
unconstitutional, because it abridged freedom of press and of religion-rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by state legislation.
On the same day that the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Mars&v.
Alabama it also declared invalid a similar statute of the State of Texas 3 as applied
to a Jehovah's Witness who refused to discontinue religious activities in a village
owned by the federal government, although he had been ordered to do so by the
manager of the village.
The Court stated in its opinion that the difference in ownership of the two
towns did not affect the result in any way, for the First Amendment safeguards
the freedom of press of religion from abridgment by action of either Congress or
federal agencies pursuant to Congressional authorization.
The Supreme Court has held that the concept of liberty embraced in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes those liberties guaranteed by
the First Amendment.4 The legislatures of the several states are, therefore, as unable
as Congress to enact laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. The same restriction applies to municipal ordinances, for, it is held, municipal ordinances adopted
under state authority constitutes state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5
The Court has seen fit to treat of the prohibition on legislation concerning the
exercise of religion in a double aspect.6 Freedom of conscience or belief is absolute, but
freedom to act in accordance with such belief is not. The extent to which such
conduct may be regulated is highly uncertain.
In the case of Cantwell v. ConnectieUt7 the Supreme Court held invalid a statute
of Connecticut,8 prohibiting the solicitation of contributions for any alleged religious
3. Tucker v. State of Texas, 90 L. Ed. 235, 66 Sup. Ct. 274 (1946). Article
479, Chapter 3 of the Texas Penal Code provided: "Any Peddler or hawker of goods
or merchandise who enters upon premises owned or leased by another and willfully
refuses to leave said premises after having been notified by the owner or possessor of
said premises, or his agent, to leave the same, shall be fined not less than one nor
more than twenty-five dollars."
4. Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U. S. 296, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 60 Sup. Ct. 900
(1939).
5. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S.444, 82 L. Ed. 949, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1937).
6. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S.296, 84 L. Ed. 1213, 60 Sup. Ct.
900 (1939).
7. Ibid.
8. "No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable
thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from other
than a member of the organization for whose benefit such person is soliciting
or within the county in which such person or organization is located unless such
cause shall have been approved by the secretary of the public welfare council.
Upon application of any person in behalf of such cause, the secretary shall determine whether such cause is a religious one or is a bona fide object of charity
or philanthrophy and conforms to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity, and, if he shall so find, shall approve the same and issue to the authority
in charge a certificate to that effect. Such certificate may be revoked at any time.
Any person violating any provision of this section shall be fined not more than
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss1/10
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cause, unless a certificate therefore had first been issued by a designated public
official, who was given authority to determine whether the cause was a religious
one. The Court has likewise held to be unconstitutional ordinances requiring the
securing of a license as a condition precedent to the right to distribute literature,
whether or not a tax was collected in connection therewith.9 The Court explained
that liberty of circulation is as essential to freedom of the press as liberty of publication."' Obviously, if unlimited restrictions could be placed on circulation, then the
freedom of the press could be effectively curtailed, for the primary purpose of publication of literature is circulation.
The Supreme Court stated in Murdock v. Pennsylvania"l that hand distribution
of religious tracts is a form of religious activity, that it occupies the same status under
the First Amendment is do worship in churches and preaching from pulpits, and
that it is entitled to the same protection as the more orthodox exercises of religion.
It has held that a municipality may prohibit the use of its streets for the distribution
of purely commercial handbills,12 but that it may not do so as to handbills of a
religious nature, even though the particular ordinance does not discriminate against
religious handbills but prohibits alike the distribution of all types of handbills.'"
The fact that religious literature is sold rather than donated does not result in its
distribution being commercial.14
Mr. Justice Reed in his dissent in Marsh v. Alabama"s refers to the case of
Martin v. Struthers."' In that decision the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
as a denial of freedom of speech and press a municipal ordinance prohibiting any
person from summoning a resident of a dwelling house to the door for the purpose
of distributing to him any handbill or circular. The Court mentioned with apparent
approval the general trespass after warning statutes existing in at least twenty
states. It stated that the decision as to whether a distributor of literature may call
one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or both." Connecticut General Statutes, Section 6294 as amended by Section 860 d. of the 1937
supplement.
9. In Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418, 87 L. Ed. 873, 63 Sup. Ct. 667 (1942),
the ordinance prohibited the solicitation or orders for book wares, or merchandise
within the residential area without first obtaining a permit, to be issued within the
dscretion of a municipal officer. In Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 82 L. Ed.
literature of any kind at any place within the city without the written permission
949, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1937), the applicable ordinance forbade the distribution of
of the city manager. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. Ed.
1292, 63 Sup. Ct. 870 (1942) the ordinance imposed a flat license tax upon solicitors
of orders for goods or merchandise of any kind.
10. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 82 L. Ed. 949, 58 Sup Ct. 666 (1937).
11. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292, 63 Sup Ct 870
(1942).
12. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52, 86 L. Ed. 1262, 62 Sup Ct. 920
(1941).
13. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 87 L. Ed. 869, 63 Sup. Ct. 669 (1942).
14. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292, 93 Sup. Ct. 870
(1942).
5. 90 L. Ed. 227, 232, 66 Sup. Ct. 276, 281 (1946).
16. 319 U. S. 141, 87 L. Ed. 1313, 63 Sup. Ct. 862 (1942).
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at a home should be left with the home-owner himself. Obviously, in the Marslh case
there is no doubt as to the wishes of the owner in the matter. However, a corporation,
owning a corporation town, can hardly be considered to be an ordinary househ'older.
As the majority opinion points out, a company town is in most respects like any
other town. Should the mere fact that a single corporation has title to all of the land
in the town enable that corporation to bar the distribution of literature?
The Court appeared to be influenced by the fact that many people live in
company-owned towns. It referred to a report 7 showing that during a certain period
of time approximately one-half of the miners in the bituminous coal industry resided
in company-owned houses. There is involved in the company town situation not
only the right of freedom of religion but also the interests of labor. If it were not
for the magnitude of the problem of the company-owned town, the Court might
have assumed a somewhat different attitude.
The Supreme Court has previously held that an employer may not prohibit
employees from soliciting union membership during nonworking time on the property of the employer.' s A lower federal court has held that refusal to permit union
representatives to come onto the premises of the employer for the purpose of soliciting union membership amounts to a violation of the employees' right of collective
bargaining. 1' Mr. Justice Reed in his dissent suggests that the case of employer
interference with solicitation of union membership is not applicicable, for the right
of employee organization is guaranteed by a regulatory statute and not by a Constitutional provision. It might be suggested, however, that a right, expressly guaranteed by a Constitutional provision, should be considered to be of even greater
dignity than one derived from a statutory enactment. If activity necessary to the
organization of labor may be engaged in upon the premises of an employer, contrary to his express direction, then it would seem reasonable to conclude that activities necessary to the exercise of religion may be carried out upon the premises of
an unwilling employer.
The holding of the instant case does not necessarily indicate that the Court
would reach- the same result in an instance where the distribution of literature
occurs at some place other that upon a sidewalk or street. A sidewalk is a particularly appropriate place for the dissemination of ideas, and there is less likelihood
of interference with the interests of others than in places less public. If the appellant
had attempted to distribute her religious literature within the nearby postoffice or
stores a somewhat different question would have been presented. Her efforts under
such circumstances might amount to a serious interferrence with the business carried on within such establishments. If the appellant had insisted upon remaining
within a company-owned dwelling house contrary to the expressed desires of a resi17. U. S. Coal Commission, Report, 1925, Part III, pp. 1467, 1469.
18. Republic Aviation Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 324
U. S. 793, 89 L. Ed. 1372, 65 Sup. Ct 982 (1944).
19. National Labor Relations Board v. Cities Service Oil Co., 122 F. (2d),
149 (1941).
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dent thereof, then again the Court might very well have arrived at a different conclusion. A tenant in possession of a company-owned house would be in the position
of an individual householder. In Martin v. Strutker the Court indicated that a
householder may within his option determine whether he shall permit such an invasion of his privacy.
The Court admits that there has been no irrevocable dedication of the sidewalk
to the public use. However, the Court does not admit that tle case may be disposed
of upon the basis of the property interests of the corporation. The more an owner of
property opens up his property to use by the general public, the more do his rights
become restricted by the rights of those who use the property. In balancing property
rights against the rights of freedom of press and religion the Court grants a preference to the latter.20 The corporation could, if it so desired, entirely close the sidewalk and town to the public. Since, however, the corporation has seen fit to permit
the public to make use of the sidewalk, members of the public have a Constitutional
right to disseminate religious ideas while thereon.
The position of the Court seems to be that once a corporation owning a company
town admits members of the public to the use of a sidewalk of such town, it may
not thereafter revoke the license of a particular member of the public because of
his exercise of religion while on such premises.
WILLIAM E. AULGUR

CONVERSiON-LIABILTY

OF LIVESTOCK COMMISSION MERCHANTS

FOR SALE OF

LIVESTOCK CONSIGNED BY ONE NOT THE OWNER

Cresswell v. Leftridge'
Five head of cattle were stolen from the plaintiff's farm. The plaintiff alleged
that the cattle were stolen by Dan Leftridge and consigned by him to the Leo
Hardy Livestock Commission of St. Louis, Missouri. He further alleged that the
cattle were sold for Leftridge by the Leo Hardy Livestock Commission Company
and the proceeds of the sale, less expenses, were remitted to him. There was no
showing that the Leo Hardy Livestock Commission Company, or any person connected therewith, knew or had reason to know that the cattle were not the property
of the consignor. The plaintiff sued the defendants, Dan Leftridge, the Leo Hardy
Livestock Commission Company and the owner thereof, Leo Hardy, for conversion
of the cattle. Later he dismissed the suit against the Leo Hardy Livestock Commission Company. The plaintiff had the judgment in the trial court, and the defendant, Leo Hardy, appealed. The Springfield Court of Appeals held that the evidence
disclosed only that some cattle-not shown, more than by suspicion, to have been the
20. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292, 63 Sup. Ct. 870
(1942)

11 Mo. L. REV. 197, 313.
1. 194 S. W. (2d) 48 (1946).
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cattle of the plaintiff-vere delivered by Dan Leftridge to the Leo Hardy Livestock
Commission Company and sold by it. The court then said that even if it were
admitted that the cattle belonged to the plaintiff, neither the Leo Hardy Livestock
Commission Company nor Leo Hardy were liable in conversion to him; that they
were mere bailees of Leftridge, and as such, under the evidence, could not be charged
with notice from where the cattle came or who owned them.
It is the general rule, and the rule which has long been recognized in this state,
that a seller of stolen property, even though innocent, has converted the property
and is liable to the true owner for the value thereof. It is also generally recognized
that, prima facie, a sale of another's property evidences conversion, i.e., any voluntary act which changes the nature of the goods and places them beyond the reach
of the owner. 2
While the general rule is as stated above, it is recognized by the courts that it
is not a conversion merely to take possession of property as a depository or common
carrier. Cases involving a bailee acting merely as a conduit depository, e.g., a common
carrier, have uniformly held that such a bailee, who has acted reasonably in accepting the goods from a thief or other converter without notice of the lack of title in
the consignor, is not liable to the true owner for conversion thereof if the property
was disposed of in accordance with the terms of the bailment 3
The court in the instant case failed to explain its holding that a livestock commission merchant is a "mere" bailee acting as a conduit. With one exception, previous
Missouri cases based on sets of facts similar to those in the instant case have
followed the general rule and have uniformly held that a livestock commission merchant selling stolen property is a converter and is liable to the true owner for the
value thereof.'
The exception is Blackwell v. Laird5 which also held that a livestock commission merchant, innocently selling stolen property, is not liable as a converter.
As the court in that case points out, the Packers & Stockyards Act, 1921,0 applicable
to stockyards, market agencies, dealers, etc. provides in part as follows: "It shall be
the duty of every stockyard owner and market agency to furnish upon reasonable
2. Kock v. Branch & Crookes, 44 Mo. 542, 100 Am. Dec. 324 (1869);
Kramer v. Faulkner, 9 Mo. App. 494 (1890); note 13 L. R. A. 605 (1891); note
50 L.,R. A. (NS) 52 (1914); collection of cases and note (1922) 20 A. L. R. 132.
3. Nanson v. Jacob, 93 Mo. 331, 6 S. W. 246, 3 Am. St. Rep. 531 (1887);
note 18 L. R. A. (NS) 494 (1909); note (1926) 43 A. L. R. 171.
4. Lafayette County Bank v. Metcalfe, Moore & Co., 40 Mo. App. 494
(1890); Thompson, Payne & Co., v. Irwin, Allen & Co., 76 Mo. App. 418 (1898);
Arkansas City. Bank v. Cassidy, 71 Mo. App. 186 (1897), where the court
said, "Factors and agents may render themselves liable for conversion. If such persons sell or intermeddle with property, it is no answer that they acted for another
or under authority from another who himself had no authority. It is their business
to know the character of the persons with whom and for whom they deal, and
to see to it that their principals are able to protect them if their action in reference
to the property bought and sold amounts to a conversion."
5. 236 Mo. App. 1217, 163 S. W. (2d) 91 (1942).
6. 42 STAT. 164 (1921), 7 U. S. C. A. § 205.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss1/10
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request, without discrimination, reasonable stockyard services at such stockyards
... ." The United States Supreme Court has held that this act has made the stockyards and the marketing agencies connected therewith public utilities.7 This decision
opened the way fqr the Kansas City Court of Appeals to take the logical step in
Blackwell v. Laird8 and to treat the stockyards and kindred agencies, so far as
innocent conversion of stolen property consigned to them is conzerned, in the same
manner as other public utilities which act merely as conduits. It is pointed out by
that court that stockyards as public utilities must perform, without discrimination,
the services requested in absence of good reason for not doing so. It would be unlawful, in such case, for them to refuse to receive the animals. Therefore, it would
be unjust when later it is discovered that the consigned property really belongs to
someone else to held the commission merchant liable as a converter if he acted
reasonably.
The decisions in the instant case and in Blackwell v. Laird9 seem to be a natural
evolution of the law regarding the liability of livestock commission merchants for
the innocent conversion of livestock consigned to them by one other than the true
owner. It would not be in the interest of the trade nor in the public interest to hold
that a livestock commission merchant acts at his peril unless he ascertains the true
state of ownership by conducting an inquiry or investigation into the ownership of
all livestock consigned to it for sale. The volume of livestock passing through the
usual commission merchant's hands makes such an investigation impractical. Since
most of the livestock from the ranges and farms pass through such agencies on their
way to the markets, it is to the interest of the public, in a commercial sense, that
the flow be expedited.
Louis W. CowAN

DEscNT AND DISTRIBUTION-EFFECT OF RENUNCIATION BY HEIR AT LAW
AS AGAINST CREDITORS

Bostian v. Milens'
The trustee of the estate of Bessie Eichenberg, a bankrupt, instituted a suit
in equity, seeking cancellation of written and oral renunciations by which the bankrupt had undertaken to renounce her rights as an heir at law of her deceased brother,
Harry C. Milens, and a decree that the plaintiff trustee be vested with the title to
7. In Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S.495, 516, 42 Sup. Ct. 397, 402, 66 L. Ed.
735( 1922), the court said: "The act, therefore, treats the various stockyards of
the country as great national public utilities to promote the flow of commerce
from the ranges and farms of the West to the consumers in the East. It assumes
that they conduct a business affected by public use of a national character and subject to national regulation."
8. 236 Mo. App. 1217, 163 S.W. (2d) 91 (1942).
9. Ibid.
1. Bostian v. Milens, 192 S.W. K. C. A. A. (2d) 797 (Mo. App. 1946).
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an undivided one-fourth interest in the decedent's estate, such estate consisting entirely of personal property. Subsequent to the alleged oral renunciations but prior to
the written renunciations, Bessie Eichenberg and the other heirs of Harry C. Milens
had entered into a written contract involving a portion of the decendent's estate.
The trial court found for the plaintiff. The Kansas City Court of Appeals, in affirming
the judgment of the trial court, held that as a part of the general theory of intestate
succession, the heir at law has no power to prevent the passage of title to himself
by a renunciation or disclaimer, and that even if this were not true, the written
renunciation was void because prior thereto Bessie Eichenberg had accepted her
interest in the estate by exercising dominion over it in signing the above mentioned
written contract.
Most courts and text-writers recognize the right of a devisee or legatee under
a will to disclaim or renounce such devise or legacy, provided he has not already
accepted it.2 A devisee-debtor may even defeat his judgment creditors by renouncing
the devise, for, in the absence of fraud or collusion, the motives which prompt a
renunciation ar immaterial. Since the renunciation relates back to the time the gift
was made, no estate vests in the devisee, and a rejection by him is not equivalent
to a conveyance for the purpose of defeating creditors.3 By the same reasoning, th'e
courts have upheld the right of a donee, as against creditors, to renounce a gift
4
inter vivos.
If the owner of property dies without a will, however, the title to such property
passes by force of the rules of law, and no voluntary act on the part of either the
former owner who is dead, or of the subsequent owner who takes by intestate succession, is of any legal significance. 5 The law having cast the title upon the heir,
he is without power to prevent the passage of such title by a renunciation or disclaimer. The text-writers generally agree that an heir at law is the only person who,
by the common law, becomes the owner of land without his own agency or assent,
and that he is not now allowed any choice whether he will become the owner of
land as the successor of his ancestor, or not.8 Although the case law on this subject
is sparse, the courts in this country seem generally to hold a renunciation by an heir
at law to be ineffective. 7 It has been so held where creditor's rights were not involved. 8 At least two text-writers have taken a contrary view, and some courts

2. Seifner v. Weller, Mo. Sup., 171 S. W. (2d) 617 (1943); Sanders v. Jones,
347 Mo. 255, 147 S. W. (2d) 424 (1940); Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474,
187 N. W. 20, 27 A. L. R. 465 (1922); ATKINSONr, WILLS (1937) 726.
3. Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N. W. 20 27 A. L. R. 465,
472 (1922); 69 C. J. 974.
4. Note (1929) 67 A. L. R. 1226.
5. PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) 138.
6. WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 1902) see. 1829; 2 BLACKSTONES
COMMENTARIES, § 201; BINGHAM, LAWS OF DESCENT (1870) 1-3.
7. Coomes v. Finegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7 N. W. (2d) 729 (1943); Payton v.
Monroe, 110 Ga. 262, 34 S. E. 305 (1899).
8. See Watson v. Watson. 13 Conn. 83 (1839).
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seem to uphold the right of an heir at law to renounce his intestate share.9 But it
should be noted that some cases cited in support of the principle that an heir can
renounce are not cases in which the heir prevents the estate from descending to him,
but rather are cases illustrating different methods by which the heir can dispose
of the interest he has acquired by descent. 10
There seems to be no valid reason why the law prohibiting renunciation in
case of intestate succession should not apply without distinction to botlh real and
personal property. The contention by the appellants in the principle case that title
to personal property descends to the administrator and therefore never vested in the
heir was disposed of by the court's pointing out that the administrator is merely a
trustee and the equitable title is in the heir.".
Numerous attempts have been made to explain the distinction between th'e right
2
of a beneficiary under a will and one taking by descent to renounce an estate.'
According to an early explanation, the law cast the title on the heir and would not
allow uncertainty as to the person in whom it was vested, hence an heir cannot
disclaim his title; while a devise, being the voluntary act of an individual, should
not be forced on any man. 13 The reason for this distinction advanced by the court in
the principle case is that a devisee is allowed to renounce because the devisor might
14
otherwise place a burden upon him as a condition to the enjoyment of the gift.
These purely technical explanations fail to disclose any logical reason why a devisee
or legatee should be allowed to defeat his creditors by a renunciation. The right to
reject a non-beneficial bequest could be preserved without applying the fiction of
"relation back", and holding that the title has never vested. The theory that title
to a renounced devise has never vested seems to be based on the misconception that
acceptance by the devisee or legatee is necessary to perfect a devise or bequest. The
requirement of acceptance has resulted from the assimilation of principles of contract law to principles of conveyancing.'s A more reasonable and just result could
be reached by treating the devisee and legatee in the same manner as the court
treats the heir at law in the principle case. A recent California case has handled the
problem in this way.:'
At Roman law, since an heir who accepted a succession became personally liable
for the debts of his ancestor, an intestate succession was always subject to renunc9. See Snell v. Snell, 165 Ga. 724, 142 S. E. 96 (1928); ATKINSON, WILLS

(1937) 726; 1 BouvorR, INSTITUTES (1st ed. 1851) 37, 38.

10. Rice v. Braden, 243 Pa. 141, 89 Atl. 877 (1914) (release by heir after
deathe of testator as part of compromise); Haden v. Haden's Heirs, 30 Ky. (J. J.
Mar.) 168 (1832) (ancestor made advancements unenforceable by law; after
ancestor died heirs agreed upon a distribution which allowed for such advances; held
valid).
11. Op. cit. supra note 1, 803.
12. Op. cit. supra note 8.
13. WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY (18th ed.) 83, 84.
14. Op cit. supra note 1, 802.
15. Note (1941) 27 Va. L. Rev. 936.
16. 1n re Kalt's Estate, 108 P. (2d) 401 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1940).
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iation.17 This rule is embodied in the statutory law of one of our states.18 But in
those jurisdictions whose legal systems are based on the common law, such authority
as may be found is clearly in support of the conclusion reached by the Kansas City
Court of Appeals in this case.
HERBERT CAIN CASTEEL

GOVERNMENT LIABILITY IN TORT-JURISDICTION
EMINENT DOMAIN-TAKING

OF COURT OF CLAIMS-

OF PRIVATE PROPERTY BY REPEATED

Low-LEVEL FLIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT

United States v. Causby1
Plaintiffs owned land near an airport leased by defendant from 1942 to 1967,
or six month's after the end of the national emergency, whichever should first occur.
Frequent and regular flights of military aircraft, especially the heavier types, passed
over plaintiffs' land and buildings at an altitude of about 83 feet. The noise and
glaring lights resulted in destruction of the use of plaintiffs' property as a commercial chicken farm and interference with the peace and comfort of their home.
Since the Government was not suable in tort, plaintiffs sought compensation in the
Court of Claims for an alleged taking of their property. The Court of Claims held
that defendant had taken an easement in the airspace over plaintiffs' land. 2 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held: Judgment reversed. There has been a
taking, but the cause is remanded for additional findings of fact as to the precise
description of the easement taken.

The theory of the action brought here is a consequence of the Government's
immunity to suit in tort. Had plaintiffs been seeking relief for similar injury caused
by privately operated aircraft, their remedy would have been a tort action for nuisance or trespass or a suit to enjoin further low-level flights over their land.8 But
such remedies were not available against the United States, which, as a sovereign
government, may not be sued by a private citizen without its consent.4 Plaintiffs'
17. 4 PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) 140.
18. LA. CIVIL CODE (1932) Art. 946. "Though the succession be acquired
by the heir from the moment of the death of the deceased, his right is in suspense,
until he decide whether he accepts or rejects it.
"If the heir accept, he is considered as having succeeded to the deceased from
the moment of his death; if he rejects it, he is considered as never having received
it."

1. 66 S.Ct. 1062 (1946).
2, Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. Cl. 1945).
3. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936),
7 AIR L. REV. 480; Swetiand v. Curtis Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A.
6th, 1932), 83 A. L. R. 319, 3 AIR L. REv. 151, 20 CAL. L. REv. 666; Smith v.
New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385, 69 A. L. R. 300 (1930);
PROSSER, TORTS (1941) § 13.
4. 54 Am. Jur., United States, §§ 127-140; Borchard, Governm'ent Liability in
Tort (1924-1925), 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 228. But see infra note 27.
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only alternative was to present their claim as one upon which Congress had authorized suit against the Government.
Under the Tucker Act 5 the United States has consented in advance to be sued
in the Court of Claims on claims founded upon the Constitution, upon any contract,
express or implied, with the Government, or for damages in cases not sounding in
tort. By virtue of the condition placed by the Fifth Amendment upon the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, 6 the existence of a "taking" of
private property for public use provides a basis upon which the Court of Claims
may entertain the owner's suit against the United States. For wherever, without
assertion of title, private property is appropriated by the Government, an implied
cotract arises to pay the reasonable value thereof.7 Moreover, if there is a taking,
the claim is one "founded upon the Constitution," without reference to contract 8
On the other hand, no obligation arises from a tort as such. The fiction of waiving
a tort and suing in assumpsit cannot be used to evade the Government's immunity. 9
Thus, in order to recover against the United States for injury which is essentially
tortious, plaintiffs are obliged to establish a taking of their property by right of
eminent domain. The single issue is whether there has been a "taking" of private
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
It is not clear, however, what constitutes a taking, as this term has been construed by the courts.' 0 The numerous decisions, relating to a great variety of factual
situations, have not produced a clearcut basis upon which to differentiate a compensable taking from mere incidental, consequential injury for which no recovery
may be had against the Government. Conflict has existed a physical conception of
the eminent domain process, viewing property as consisting of tangible physical
objects, as contrasted with a legal relations approach. 1 The latter has steadily gained
ground, so that it may now be stated somewhat generally that acts causing substantial and permanent interference with the use and enjoyment of property amount to
5. 24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C. § 250 (1) (1940). The federal district
courts are given concurrent jurisdiction of claims not exceeding $10,000. 28 U. S. C.
§ 41 (20) (1940).
6. U. S. CONsT. AMEND. V;

....

nor shall private property be taken for pub-

lic use without just compensation." Nearly all state constitutions contain a similar
provision. 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, § 3.
7. This proposition is firmly established. 28 U. S. C. A. § 250(1) note 140,
and cases cited; Crane, Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims (1920) 34 HARv. L. REv.
161.
8. Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U. S. 18, 21, 60 S. Ct.
413, 415, 84 L. Ed. 554, 557 (1939); Anderson, Tort and Implied Contract Liability
of the Federal Government (1946) 30 MINN. L. REv. 133, 157.
9. Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269, 274, 19 L. Ed. 453, 454 (1868);
Anderson, supra note 8, at 134; 54 Am. Jur., United States, § 137.
10. For an excellent discussion of the problem and review of the cases,
see Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain (1931)

41 YALE L. J.

221. Also Lawis, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1888) §§ 53-59; 18 Am. Jur., EMINENT DOMAIN, §§ 132-135.
11. Cormack, supra note 10.
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a taking, though title and possession remain undisturbed. In any event, considerations of policy should override legal formulae in eminent domain proceedings. 1"
In their consideration of this problem in the present case, both the Supreme
Court 14 and the Court of Claims's placed great emphasis upon modern theories as
to the ownership of airspace, and stressed plaintiffs' dominant property right in the
airspace through which Government aircraft passed.', The view followed, that
ownership extends to so much of the airspace as is necessary for enjoyment of the
surface, is well supported, so far as practical consequences are concerned, on one
theory or another.17 And the Government's contention that legislation making the
navigable airspace over this country part of the public domain' 8 was intended to
include airspace needed for landing and taking off, is properly rejected as untenable,19
since it implies that privately owned land might with impunity be rendered completely. uninhabitable through operation of aircraft at very low altitudes. Moreover,
it has been stated that such legislation is not determinative of the landowner's

12. United States v. General Motors Corp., 65 S. Ct. 357, 89 L. Ed. 379
(1945); Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546, 34 S. Ct. 654, 58
L. Ed. 1088 (1913); United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333, 30 S. Ct. 527, 54
L. Ed. 757 (1910); United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 23 S. Ct. 349, 47 L.
Ed. 539 (1902); Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 317, 2
S. Ct. 719, 27 L. Ed. 739 (1882); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 13 Wall
166, 20 L. Ed. 557 (1871).
13. Cormack, supra note 10, at 259: "It is neither riecessary nor desirable
that legalistic considerations have any place in connection with the awarding of compensation in eminent domain proceedings. Considerations of policy should control.
If from the standpoint of policy it is desirable that a citizen have compensation,
there should be no hesitation, under constitutional provisions, in awarding it
to him. The legal relations of an individual cover every aspect of his existence, and
when tlere is violation of these relations, his property is taken. Manifestly it is
not practicable for society to compensate proceedings, any more than it is feasible
for the courts to take into consideration the remote consequences of torts or other
occurences. The problem is one of practical expediency. The judicial experiences in the administration of eminent domain proceedings indicate that it is important that the problem be recognized, in this field as elsewhere, as one of drawing
the line between proximate and remote consequences."
14. United States v. Causby, 66 S. Ct. 1062 (1946).
15. Causby v. United States 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. Cl. 1945).
16. This aspect of the case has been dealt with in the following Notes on
the Court of Claims decision (supra note 15(; (1945) 9 Detroit L. J. 30, 58 HAMnv.
L. REv. 1252, 19 So. CALIF. L. REv. 130, (1946) 46 COL. L. REv. 121. For more
deliberate treatment, see Noel, Airports and Their Neighbors (1946) 19 TENN. L.
REV. 563.
17. Cases cited supra note 3: PRossER, TORTS, (1941) § 13, and extensive
footnote references.
18. The Air Commerce Act of 1925, 44 Stat. 568, 49 U. S. C. § 171 et seq.,
gives the United States exclusive sovereignty in the navigable airspace over
as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 973, 49 U. S. C. § 401
this country. "Navigable airspace" is defined as "airspace above the minimum safe
altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority." 49 U. S. C.
§ 180.
19. United States v. Causby, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 1067 (1946).
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rights. 20 Thus the way is open for the conclusion that flights over private land
constitute a taking if "they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land."2 1
It is difficult to see why this result should be deemed a radical or unreasonable
extension of the concept of taking in the constitutional sense. 22 In the writer's
opinion, there is a tendency to confuse taking of the land with taking of the airspace
over the land, and to lose sight of the former as the critical line of inquiry. Before
there can be any taking of the airspace, ownership thereof must be established, but
such ownership of the airspace would not seem to be prerequisite to the existence of
a taking of the land itself. The manner in which the alleged taking of land, i.e.,
substantial interference with its beneficial use, is accomplished, whether through
physical invasion of the surface, of the supervening airspace, or activities on adjacent
land, is not conclusive.23 The injury here complained of is an immediate, foreseeable 24 consequence of frequent flights of heavy aircraft at tree-top level, and represented a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of plaintiffs' property
for a period which, at the time suit was brought, appeared likely to last indefinitely. 25

20. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932);
Bouve, Private Ownership of Navigable Air Space Under the Commerce Clause
(1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 416. The latter authority, writing in support of the public
right of freedom of transit through the airspace, makes the following significant
qualification (p. 421 of the article cited): "It should be emphasized, in closing, that
the above considerations are addressed to the claim of private property in .avigable
.Ma
jo uoiundo alp uI *aol~ds Ile
Xaaatp
_aadns aiwds airi oi uoqmildde ou gmAmp
vening over privately owned land which is actually occupied by the owner or
reasonably susceptible of occupancy having in mind the uses to which the land
is or may be put. The proprietary interest which the owner has in such air space
is indissolubly merged with the title to and enjoyment of the soil. Although Congress has under the commerce clause the undoubted power to fix the lower limit
of altitude of navigable air space where it sees fit, it is. believed that if it were to
fix it at an altitude whicl would result in a taking of air space actually occupied,
or air space reasonably susceptible of such occupancy, the taking would call for
compensation under the Fifth Amendment." (Italics ours.)
21. United States v. Causby, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 1068 (1946).
22. See Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in United States v. Causby, 66 S. Ct.
1062. 1069 (1946).
23. Flooding: United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333, 30 S. Ct. 527, 54 L. Ed.
757 (1919); United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 23 S. Ct. 349, 47 L. Ed. 539
(1902); Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 13 Wall. 166, 20 L. Ed. 557
(1871). Invasion of airspace: Portsmouth Harbor Land and Hotel Co. v. United
States, 260 U. S. 327, 43 S. Ct. 135, 67 L. Ed. 287 (1922) (firing of coast defense
guns across plaintiffs' land, thereby rendering it unusuable as hotel and summer
resort). This case was relied on heavily in the present decision. Smoke, odors,
roise and vibration: Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546, 34 S.
Ct. 654, 58 L. Ed. 1088 (1913): Baltimore and P. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church
108 U. S. 317, 2 S. Ct. 719, 27 L. Ed. 739 (1882).
24. The problem has been stated to be one of drawing the line between
proximate and remote consequences. Supra note 13.
25. The Government's lease of the adjoining airport was for twenty-five years
(1942-1967), or until six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever
should first occur.
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In theory this should have been sufficient to establish a taking, without the additional element of trespass.
Legislation abolishing the general tort immunity of the Federal Government,
long advocated, 28 has recently been passed by Congress. 27 The new law provides
for administrative settlement of tort claims up to $1,000, and litigation of larger
claims in the federal district courts, subject to review by the circuit courts of appeal
or the Court of Claims. Apparently, therefore, under the facts of the principal case,
litigants will no longer be obliged to resort to an action based on the artificial theory
employed here of a "taking" of their property by the Government, but may sue
directly in tort.
WILL Am A. BEnT
INsURANcE-BREACH

OF WARRANTY AGAINST OTHER INSURANCE

Kossmehl v. Millers Natidnal Insurance Company'
Defendant, Millers Insurance Company, had issued its policy against loss of
plaintiff's jewelry upon an application executed by her husband. The policy
(hereinafter called the first policy) provided: "Warranted by the Assured that
no other insurance is or will be carried on the property insured hereunder during
the term of this policy except as may be endorsed hereon" and "This entire policy
shall be void if the Assured has concealed or misrepresented any material fact or
circumstance concerning this insurance or the subject thereof, or in case of any
fraud or false swearing by the Assured touching any matter relating to this insurance or the subject thereof, whether before or after loss." Plaintiff subsequently
was divorced from her husband and being under the impression that he had
cancelled the first policy, she obtained from the Dubuque Fire and Marine Insurance Company a policy (hereinafter called the second policy) on the ring and
other property, which policy stipulated that "no other insurance is permitted on
the property insured hereunder except as may be endorsed hereon." Plaintiff
lost her ring, valued at $1400.00, and presented her claim against defendant, which
denied liability on the ground that the second policy violated the warranty against
other insurance. She then presented her claim to Dubuque, which also denied Iia26. Anderson, supra note 8, at 182; Borchard, supra note 4.
27. Federal Tort Claims Act, Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946, Pub. L. No. 601, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 2, 1946). Abolition of Governmental tort immunity was for the ostensible purpose of increasing legislative efficiency and economy, through elmination of private relief bills. The act also provides
that both administrative settlement and litigation are governed by a one-year
statute of limitations; rules of liability will be the same as if the Government were
an individual, but recovery is limited to actual damages; suits are to be heard without a jury; and there are provisions relating to limitation of attorneys' fees. Certain
exceptions are made to the general tort liability.
See forthcoming, Gottlieb The New Government Tort Jct (1946) 35 GEORGETOWN L. J. (Nov.).
1. 185 S. W. (2d) 293 (Mo. App. 1945).
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bility but which, after unsuccessfully seeking to pro-rate the loss with defendant, subsequently advanced to plaintiff the sum of '$1200.00 as a loan payable
only to the extent of any net recovery she might thereafter obtain from defendant. Plaintiff obligated herself to prosecute the instant case, which was to be under
the exclusive direction of Dubuque and with no expense to plaintiff, for $750.00
plus attorney's fee and penalty. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed.
Held: the judgment for $750.00 with interest affirmed but judgment for penalty reversed. As the first policy was in full force and effect at the time the
second policy was issued, the existence of the first policy violated the express condition of the second policy, rendering the letter voidable. Because the second policy never became enforceable, it was not such other insurance as would defeat
liability on the first policy.
Clauses against "other insurance" have been almost universal in property insurance policies. Over-insurance definitely increases the moral risk to the insurer, through temptation to carelessness in preserving the subject of the insurance
or to positive dishonesty in causing its loss.2 The moral hazard resulting from overinsurance is the same whether the additional insurance exists prior to or is obtained subsequent to the policy in litigation. The materiality of representations
relating to over-insurance is consistently recognized 3 and fully justifies refusal of
the insurer to compensate the insured for loss.4 It is probable that the moral hazard to the insurer is as great where the additional insurance policies are voidable
as it is where they are valid, because the insured either does not appreciate
that they are voidable or hopes that a successful defense will never be made upon
them (it seems obvious he would not obtain additional insurance which he knew
he would never collect on). Nevertheless, the more common interpretation of
such warranties or conditions limits them to "valid" other insurance. 5 The standard
New York policy until recently prohibited "other insurance, valid or not" under
which provision the result of the instant case could hardly be reached. 6
2. Obermeyer v. Globe Mutual Insurance Co., 43 Mo. 573 (1869); Cox v.
Home Insurance Co. of New York, 331 Mo. 10, 52 S. W. (2d) 872 (1932); Dahlberg v. St. Louis Mutual Insurance Co., 6 Mo. App. 121 (1878); VANCE, INsURANcE

(2d ed. 1930) 726; 29 AM. Jun. 566 paragraph 731.
3. Dolan v. Mo. Town Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 88 Mo. App. 666 (1901).
4. Cox v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 331 Mo. 10, 52 S. W. (2d) 872 (1932)
Dahlberg v. St. Louis Mutual Ins. Co., 6 Mo. App. 121 (1878); Beazell v. Farmer's
Mutual Ins. Co., 214 Mo. App. 430, 153 S. W. (2d) 125 (1923); but see Obermeyer
v. Globe Mutual Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 573 (1869).
5. See cases cited by Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 729, n 57.
6. Reference is to the standard New York fire policy adopted in 1918, sometimes called the "commissioners Policy." A new standard policy became effective
in New York in 1943 (N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 900; N. Y. Laws 1943, c. 671) which
has been widely accepted throughout the United States. The new form eliminates
many of the so called "moral hazard" clauses and as to the provision hereunder
discussion reads: "Other insurance may be prohibited or the amount of insurance
may be limited by endorsement attached hereto." In the absence of such endorsement, other insurance is not prohibited and, depending upon the wording of the
endorsement, the problem of the instant case may or may not be avoided.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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Limitation of the provision against "other insurance" to other valid insurance
creates a hopeless dilemma where, as here, the invalidity of the other insurance rests
upon the violation of an identical "other insurance" clause by the very policy
in suit. Which policy, if either, is valid "other insurance?" Courts of other jurisdictions have answered the question variously,7 with perhaps the more approved
authority being in accord with the instant decision, although it has been observed
that if such reasoning were employed in criminal law, no person could ever be convicted of bigamy. No prior decisions have been found in Missouri. 8 It has been
held in this state that temporary, non-fraudulent, additional insurance did not
totally avoid a policy containing an "other insurance" clause where there was no excess insurance at the time of loss.9 A valid second policy will justify denial of
liability by the first insurer if the first policy contains the other insurance provision'O
and, conversely, it was said in Parks v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company"I that
if the second policy contains a warranty against "other insurance," it never becomes effective if the first policy is valid and contains no similar provision.
There is authority in other jurisdictions that the condition against other insurance is not violated by other insurance issued without the beneficiary's knowledge or consent 1 2 This rule seems just to the beneficiary, who should not be
prejudiced by conduct in which" he did not participate, and fair to the insurer,
for the moral hazard is not increased if the insured is ignorant of the existence of
other insurance.'1 By parity of reasoning, the second insurance in the instant case
might have been considered valid, the Plaintiff's assumption that her husband had
cancelled the insurance being fairly comparable under the circumstances to the
ordinary insured's assumption that no one else had obtained insurance for his
benefit. However, the facts in the Parks case suggest that it might be authority
against the adoption of this approach.
The court was evidently eager to protect the insured in this case, being undoubtedly influenced by a conviction that she had acted in good faith at all times.
It is uncertain whether a non-fraudulent misrepresentation avoids a Missouri in7. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 729; 29 AM JuR. 569 paragraph 736,
571 paragraph 737; 45 C. J. S. 273 paragraph 533.
8. Cf. Cox v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 331 Mo. 10, 52 S W (2d) 872
(1932) where the first cyclone and windstorm policy contained a clause that it
would become void if other insurance, valid or invalid, were taken out on the
property without consent of the company. This policy lapsed and a second policy
was taken out without consent of the first company, the second policy containing
a pro-rata clause in case "other insurance" exists or should be taken out. In a suit
against the second company, held it could not pro-rate since the first policy had
lasped. The court said that even if it had not lapsed, the policy would have been
void due to the existence of the other insurance without its consent. Note that the
policy had lapsed, and also that it was a cyclone and windstorm policy so that
"other insurance" cannot in fact increase the risk.
9. Obermeyer v. Globe Mutual Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 573 (1869).
10. Dahlberg v. St. Louis Mutual Ins. Co. 6 Mo. App. 121 (1878).
11. 100 Mo. 373, 12 S. W. 1058 (1890).
12. See VANCE Op. cit. supra note 2, p. 728, n. 53.
13. Cf. Obermeyer v. Globe Mut. Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 573 (1869).
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surance policy.14 If it does not, an additional argument can also be made that
the second policy was valid insurance. On either theory, the plaintiff would have
been protected but no recovery could have been obtained in the instant litigation
which was, of course, instituted for the benefit of the second insurer. The rather

arbitrary position taken by the court is neither better nor worse than the exact
converse, unless some reasoning not evident in the opinion was applied.

In the

absence of the existence of special circumstances, the only logical result is to
hold both policies invalid. 5
JERREI)

BLANCIIAB

LIBEL-DICTATION TO STENOGRAPHER AS PUBLICATION

Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital'
Defendant Tverberg, acting within the scope of his employment as secretary

of defendant hospital (a charitable, non-profit corporation) dictated to his stenographer, also an employee of the hospital, a letter to plaintiff concerning the
unpaid hospital bill of one Julia Sargent. This letter, containing statements
which were libelous per se, was transcribed and typewritten by the stenographer,
signed by Tverberg, and subsequently sent to plaintiff by registered mail. At
the close of plaintiff's case, the trial court allowed defendant's motion to dismiss
the action, holding that there was no publication of the libel, since the stenographer had "no distinct third party entity." On appeal, the Supreme Court (Nuessle,
J., dissenting) reversed the judgment of the lower court and ordered a new trial.
The majority opinion, held that the dictation of the letter to the stenographer and
her transcription of the notes constituted publication of the libel. This held to be
true whether the relation was :that of master and servant or co-employees of a corporation. The majority opinion specifically rejected the conception of the trial
court that modem business makes such universal use of stenographers that incidental communication of the libel to such persons is not publication within the
purview of the law of libel.2
Both the trial judge and the dissenting justice found support for their opinions
14. For a discussion of this problem as applied to life insurance, see Note
(1943) 8 Mo. L. REv. 137. See also Note (1928) 55 A. L. R. 743 indicating that
the cases require a showing of fraud on the part of the insured before misrepresentation as to "other insurance" is material to the risk; and 45 C. J. S.221 paragraph
489 which states that "A misrepresentation relied on as avoiding the policy must
be false in a substantial and material respect; an intent to deceive is generally not
essential if the misrepresentatior is as to a material fact and is relied on by the
insurance company."
15. Webb v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 167 Mich. 144, 132 N. W. 523 (1911);
Cox v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, 331 Mo. 10, 55 S.W. 2d 872 (1932); 29
AM. JUR. 571 paragraph 737. But see 45 C. J. S.273 paragraph 533.
1. 23 N. W. (2d) 247 (N. D. 1946).

2. Ibid.
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in a series of cases exemplified by Freeman v. Dayton Scales Co.8

In that case, a

special agent of defendant corporation dictated to his stenographer the alleged libel.
It was transcribed and typewritten by her, and mailed to the attorney for the
plaintiff. In holding this as not constituting publication, the court reasoned that a
stenographer employed by a corporation has no distinct third party entity, and

one employed by an individual is a confidential instrumentality of that individual,
not recognized as having an independent third party personality while engaged

in a mainly mechanical duty.4 A considerable body of cases in this country
supports the view thus expressed.5
The great objection to such a line of reasoning is that it seems to confuse

"publication" and "privilege." It is said that "If the defamatory matter is not
seen or heard by anyone except the defamer and the defamed, damages to character or reputation cannot result, since man's reputation is the estimate in which
others hold him, and not what he himself thinks." " This is the gist of the requirement of publication. Artificially to reduce the individual personality of a
stenographer or clerk to a piece of machinery in order to declaim that there has
been no publication seems highly questionable "legal" logic.

plaintiff lies in the loss of the esteem of other persons.

The damage to

Can it be said that a

stenographer, by the nature of his or her calling, is incapable of having any

feeling concerning the libellee? The injurious effect of the libel is the loss of
the personal esteem of the stenographer which is no less mitigated by her relation
to a common employer.7
Owen v. Ogilvie Publishing Company8 represents a somewhat different ap3. 159 Tenn. 413, 19 S. W. (2d) 255 (1929).
4. Id. at 421, 19 S. W. (2d) at 258.
5. Satterfield v. McLellan Stores, 215 N. C. 582, 2 S. E. (2d) 709 (1939)
(letter concerning plaintiff from manager of defendant corporation's store to Unemployment Compensation Commission dictated to stenographer of defendant
firm); Rodgers v. Wise, 193 S. C. 5, 7 S. E. (2d) 517 (1939) (letter to plaintiff
dictated by lawyer defendant to his stenographer); Prins v. Holland-North American Mtge. Co., 107 Wash. 206, 181 Pac. 680 (1919), 5 A. L. R. 451 (1920)
(letter from main office to branch office of defendant corporation shown to bookkeeper of branch office); Notes (1922) 18 A. L. R. 776 (referring to the decisions
of these cases as the "more modern" view). Contra: Nelson v. Whitten, 272 Fed.
135 (E. D. N. Y. 1921): Berry v. City of New York Ins. Co., 210 Ala. 369, 98 So.
290 (1923) (special agent of defendant corporation dictated letter to stenographer
of the corporation, mailed to plaintiff); Ferdon v. Dickens, 161 Ala. 181, 49 So. 888
(1909), Kiene v. Ruff, 1 Iowa, Clarke, 482, 485 (1856) (libelous letter to plaintiff
given to third person to transcribe); Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313
Mass. 337, 348, 47 N. E. (2d) 595, 602 (1943) (communication between offices
of defendant corporation concerning plaintiff); State v. McIntire, 115 N. C. 769,
20 S. E. 721 (1894) (apparently overruled by Satterfield v. McLellan, supra);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) Sec. 577, comment h.
6. 33 AM JuiL, Libel and Slander, 690.
7. Berry v. City of New York Ins. Co., 210 Ala. 369, 371, 98 So. 290, 292
(1923).
8. Owen v. J. S. Ogilvie Publishing Co., 32 App. Div. 465, 53 N. Y. Supp.
1033 (2d Dep't 1898).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss1/10
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proach in finding "no publication." The defendant corporation's general manager dictated the libel to his stenographer, also an employee of the corporation. The
letter was transcribed, typewritten, and sent to the plaintiff. The court c6ncluded that where the relation between the libellant and the copyist is that of
master and servant, there is a publication. However, such publication may be
privileged. But if they are employees of a common master, they are merely performing the duties which their respective employment requires and their acts should
be treated as a single act of the corporation not constituting publication. 9 Though
the New York courts have never specifically overruled this decision, it has been
severely questioned. 0 Certainly, it creates a very fine distinction upon which
to hang the question of publication.
Though it came some three years after the discredited Owen case, Gambrill
v. Schooley"' is usually called the leading American case on the subject. Referring
to the foregoing cases and their view that the stenographer is ". . a mere phonograph, whose function in that regard was not a mental, but purely a mechanical,
process, so that there was no such perception as is requisite to constitute publication;" the court replies that "Neither the prevalence of any business customs or
methods, nor the pressure of business which compels resort to stenographic assistance,
can make that legal which' is illegal, nor make that innocent which would other12
wise be actionable."'
Even though the reasoning in this line of cases be rejected, it does not necessarily follow that defendant shall be held liable. For many courts, in situations such
as this, have recognized without undue comment that there has been a publication;
and then have considered the publication to be conditionally or qualifiedly privileged
and thus a ground for avoidance of liability in the absence of express malice.
Thus, when the communication is between persons having a common interest in
the subject matter, the communication is privileged, if made in good faith and
without actual malice.' 3 This privilege, of course, is a matter of defense to be
pleaded and proved.' 4
Apparently the first case to consider the question of privilege in a fact situation
similar to the principal case was PUlman v. Mill.'r The alleged libel was dictated
by the managing director of defendant merchants to a clerk, who took it down
in shorthand and then transcribed and typewrote it. The letter was subsequently
mailed to plaintiffs', a partnership. Concluding without difficulty that there had
been publication, the court discussed at some length the problem of whether
9.
10.
(1927);
11.
12.
13.
(1923),
14,
15.

Id. at 467, 53 N. Y. Supp. at 1034.
Kenney v. James Butler, Inc., 245 N. Y. 204, 206, 156 N. E. 666, 667
Ostrowe v. Lee, 244 N. Y. Supp. 28, 32 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48, 48 At. 730, 52 L. R. A. 87 (1901).
Id. at 61, 48 Atl. at 731.
Berry v. City of New York Ins. Co., 210 Ala. 369, 371, 98 So. 290, 292
Kenny v. Gurley, 208 Ala. 623, 95 So. 34 (1922).
Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 41, 175 N. E. 505, 506 (1931).
Pullman and another v. Walter Hill and Co., Ltd., (1891) 1 Q. B. 524.
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or not the "occasion" was privileged. In concluding that it was not, Lord Esther
said: "Can the communication of the libel by the defendants in the present case to
the type-writer be brought within the rules of privilege as against the plaintiffs?
What interest had -the type-writer in hearing or seeing the communication?
Clearly she had none.""' And Lopes, J., added "I have never yet heard that it is
the usual course of a merchant's business to write letters containing defamatory
statements. If a merchant has occasion to write such a letter he must write it
himself, and make a copy of it himself, or he must take the consequences. ' 17
It would seem that Judge Lopes raised for the first time the idea that publication to a stenographer or clerk in the course of communication with the person
defamed may be privileged if it is incidental and reasonably necessary to the communication. The English courts had earlier recognized that publication to a third
person as a reasonably necessary incident to a privileged communication does not
abuse the occasion.18
1 The Lopes ,theory is applied in the case of Boxsius v. Goblet Freres,0 decided
'by the same judges some three years later. A solicitor, on behalf of a client, dictated a libelousletter to a clerk in his office. In finding the occasion privileged, the
court attempts to distinguish the Pullman .case. They say that, while it is not
-inhe usual course of a -merchant'sbusiness to write letters containing defamatory
statements and communicate them to a clerk, the case of a solicitoris different. The
court holds that the business of a solicitor's office necessitates the communication of
such matters to clerks and such communications should be held to be privileged2 0
-It seems doubtful that any real distinction can be made between the two
cases. However, it seems reasonably clear that the English rule in such situations
is 'that there is always publication; but the occasion may be called privileged on
the-grounds that the-communication to the stenographer or clerk is reasonable and
necessary to carry out the firm's business. This view has found some accord in
-the United States. 21
In the principal case, in considering the question of privilege it was necessary
to construe a North Dakota statute. 22 'Relying heavily on the precedent of Lord
16. Id. at 528.
17. Id. at 530.
18. Lawless v. 'The Anglo-Egyptian Cotton and Oil Co., 38 L. J.Q. B. (N. S.)
129, L. R. 4 Q. B. 262, 268 (1869) (distributing printed reports to stockholders,
in course of which the libel read by printers, held to be privileged because "usual
and necessary method of communication to interested parties"); accord, Edmondson
v. Burch and Co., Ltd and Home, (1907) 1 K. B. 371, 380 (letter from main office
of defendant to branch office dictated to stenographer held to be privileged).
19. [1894] 1 Q,B. 842.
20. Id. at 847.
21. Globe Furniture Co. v. Wright, 49 App. D. C. 315, 265 Fed. 873 (1920),
18 A. L. R. 772' (1922); Cartwright-Caps Co. v. Fischel 113 'Miss. 359, 74 So. 278
.(1917), L. R. A. 1918 F 566 (1918).
22. N. D. Revised Code (1943) Sec. 14-0205 ("A privileged communication
is one made... .ina communication, without malice, to a person interested therein
by ond who also is interested, or by one who stands in such relation to the person
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss1/10
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Esh'er's remarks in the Pullman case, the court holds that the stenographer is not
"a person interested" and therefore the communication is not privileged. It concludes that "The personal rights of the individual to be free from defamations of
character are paramount to any exigencies of business and the stehographer who
types and the office-boy who copies are individuals with personalities even if
mbre employees."
The Restatement of Torts,2 3 in its analysis of the situation, is much more careful than the courts have been to differentiate between two entirely different fact
situations. In the one situation, where the dictation to a stenographer is in the
course of communication to a third person about the libellee, 24 the questions involved are those of privilege and abuse of privilege. If the communication is
privileged, the Restatement's opinion is that the incidental publication to the stenographer or other third person, if customary and sanctioned by business or other
necessity, does not abuse the occasion. However, where the communication to the
stenographer or other third person is incidental to communication with the person
defamed, whatever protection the defendant enjoys is based entirely on the lack
of harm necessary to create a cause of action. 2 5 There can be no question of abuse
of privilege because communication to the party defamed is not privileged. Though
the Restatement states flatly that "a dictation of a defamatory letter to a stenographer who takes shorthand notes thereon is itself a publication of the libel, ' ' 26
it apparently would except from liability a defendant who could satisfactorily
show that publication to the third person was reasonably necessary and incidental
to communication with persons defamed. The decisions which have exonerated
defendants in fact situations similar to the principal case have, undoubtedly, often
been predicated on just such a doctrine. But, invariably, they have labored to
reach the more used, if less firm, ground of "no publication" or "unabused privilege."
M. HENCY

LIENS-POssEssoRy-Loss ny A-rACHMENT OR LEVY OF EXECUTION BY LIENOR
Sanders v. Brooks er al."

0 brought replevin against B and C to recover possession of four hogs. B and
C denied O's right to possession, asserting an agister's lien on the hogs. 0 claimed
the lien had been lost by surrendering two of the four hogs to the constable on a
interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication innocent.").
23. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) Sec. 577, 604.
24. Id. Sec. 604, comment b.
25. Id. Sec. 604, comment c.
26. Id. Sec. 577, comment A.
1. 194 S. NV. (2d) 540 (1946).
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levy of execution secured by C for rent owed to C by 0.2 The court held that
where goods in possession of one having a lien thereon are attached at his suit or
by his instigation, his lien is lost as to the portion so attached or surrendered, but
the remaining portion of such goods is not thereby released from the burden of the
whole lien.3

Two interesting questions are presented by the case as briefed: (1) Is an
agister's lien (or any common-law or statutory lien dependent upon possession)
lost or waived where the lienor attaches or levies execution on the subject of the
lien, and (2) if the subject of the lien is divisible and only a portion thereof is
attached or levied upon in execution, does the lien for the whole debt attach to
the remaining portion?The court in the instant case states that "it is generally held that where goods
in the possession of one having a lien on them are attached at his suit or by his
instigation his lien is waived." 4 The court states the proposition without discussion
or reference to any Missouri authority, but further holds that the lien is lost only
as to that portion so attached or surrendered and does not release the remaining
portion from the burden of the whole lien. 5
The importance of the first question is underlined in any of the following situations: (1) Where the lienor attaches the subject of the lien and the lienee becomes
bankrupt within four months after the attachment, such attachment lien being
voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy 6 (could the lienor then rely on his possessory
lien? 7); (2) where the attachment or judgment lien is quashed because of some
2. One of the two remaining hogs had died and the other had been sold
by B. This latter point of conversion was not discussed by the court.
3. Judgment was reversed and remanded, it being held that in a replevin
action by the admitted owner, though not taking possession of the hogs under the
writ, he is entitled to have the disputed question of existence and amount of agister's
lien submitted to the jury.
4 Citing as authority, 37 C. J., Sec. 54 p. 335. The leading case on the
point is Jacobs v. Latour, 2 Moore & P. 201, 5 Bing. 130 (1828). It was held that
a lien of horses for training them was waived where the lienor caused an execution
to be levied upon them for the debt secured by the lien, although h'epurchased
them at the execution sale and they were never out of his possession. The purchaser set up the lien as a defense to an action in trover by the commissioner i
bankruptcy of the original owner of the property upon the theory that if the execution would not avail against the commission in bankruptcy, the lien might be
relied upon. The decision is on the ground that the lienor's possession at the time
of the sale must be attributed to the officer who levied the execution, and the subsequent possession was by virtue of the purchase and not by virtue of the lien.
5. Citing 3 C. J. S. § 21, p. 1123.
6. 11 U. S. C. § 107 (a) 1: "Every lien against property of a person obtained
by attachment, judgment, levy, or other legal proceedings within four months
before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy

... shall

be deemed null and void (a)

if at the time when such lien was obtained such person was insolvent or (b) if such
lien was sought and permitted in fraud of the provisions of this title ...."
7. The Federal Bankruptcy Act specifically recognizes the right of the creditor
to hold his security even though his right to sue on the debt itself may be barred.
Moreover, the accepted view is that the discharge of a debtor in bankruptcy does
not work an absolute discharge of the debt itself but merely affords the debtor
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irregularity in' acquiring it, s (could the lienor then rely on his possessory lien?);

(3) where the lienee has mortgaged the chattels subject to the lien, and the lienor's
attachment is quashed for some reason or his levy of execution is unavailing for
some reason 9 (could the lienor assert the precedence of his lien over the chattel
10
mortgage? (could the chattel mortgagee replevy the chattel from the constable?
Those courts which hold that the lienor has lost his lien by levying attachment

or execution upon the subject of the lien, in the main, place their decision on the
ground that the possession by virtue of the lien, and therefore the lien itself, is

waived by the levy, the lienor being deemed to have abandoned possession in surrendering it to the sheriff. 1 And this even where the sheriff leaves the subject
Another reason
of the lien in the hands of the lienor, taking a receipt therefor.'
assigned is that by making the attachement or levy of execution the lienor is
asserting that the property levied upon belongs to the lienee and, having made the
levy, he is estopped from afterwards asserting the contrary by claiming a lien upon
the property. 13 But this reason would seem to have little or no force as it would
seem apparent that in either case, by lien or levy, the lienor is asserting that
the property belongs to the lienee. The pivotal point seems to be, to the courts,
a defense which he may plead when sued in personam on the debt. Dimock v.
Revere Copper Co., 117 U. S. 559, 6 Sup. Ct. 855 (1896); Munz v. Harnett, 6 F.
Supp. 158 (1933); Citizens' Loan Association v. Boston & Maine R. R., 196 Mass.
528, 82 N. E. 696, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1025, 124 Am. St. Rep. 584, 13 Ann. Cas.
365 (1907); Herschmann v. Justices of the Municipal Court, 220 Mass. 137, 107

N. E. 543 (1915);

RESTATEMENT, SECURITY,

Sec. 81.

8. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Johnson, 275 Fed. 112 (E. D.
Mich., 1921).
9. Neff v. Rhodes, 20 Mo. App. 347 (1886), where lienor's levy of execution
and attachment levy of another creditor of lienee were both in the hands of the
constable and although lienor's was levied first, sale was held only under levy of the
other creditor.
10. Fein v. Wyoming Loan & Trust Co., 3 Wyo. 331, 22 Pac. 1150 (1890).
11. "When he instructed the sheriff to take possession of it under the attachment, he voluntarily relinquished his own claim to the possession and transferred
it to the officer, who thenceforth held it, not as the agent of the defendant (lienor),
but as an officer of the law responsible for its safe custody as well as to the defendant
as the plaintiff in the action. After its seizure under the attachment, it was no
longer in the possession or custody of the defendant, and his lien was lost by his
voluntary surrender of all claim to the possession." Wingard v. Banning, 39 Cal. 543
(1870); Accord: Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Johnson cited supra note 8; Hill v.
N. W. 336, 27 L. R. A. *(N. S.) 692, 694; 140 Am. St. Rep. 332 (1910); Fein v.
Rhule, 71 Colo. 140, 204 Pac. 894 (1922); Stein v. McAuley 147 Iowa 630, 125
Wyoming Loan &Trust Co., cited supra note 10; BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936)
§ 121. But cf. Valley Nat. Bank v. Jackaway, 80 Iowa 512, 45 N. W. 881 (1890);
(Mass. 1829); Neff v. Rhodes, supra note 9. Contra: Jones v. Ironton Garage Co.,
Townsend v. Newell, 14 Pick. 332 (Mass. 1833); Whitaker v. Sumner, 7 Pick. 551
9 Ohio App. 431 (1918); Arendale v. Morgan, 5 Sneed 703 (Tenn. 1857); Lambert v.
Nicklass,, 45 W. Va. 527. 31 S. E. 951, 44 L. R. A. 561, 72 Am. St. Rep. 828 (1898).
See notes, 50 L. R. A. 719 (1901) for citation of cases involving pledges, carrier's
liens.
12. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Johnson, supra note 8; Jacobs v. Latour, cited
supra note 4.
13. 1 JONES, LIENS (2d ed. 1894) § 1014, and cases cited therein.
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the technical argument of loss of possession by the lienor. One case at least has
raised a loud dissenting voice, and, arguing the point on principle, has reached
14
the conclusion that there has been no abandonment of possession by the lienor.
The cases generally fail to distinguish three situations and to consider any
possible differences in the treatment they should receive: first, where lienor brings
action in manner provided by statute to eriforce his lien; second, where lienor seeks
personal judgment on the debt independent of his lien and levies attachment or
execution on the property which is the security for the debt; and, third, where the
lienor brings action on a debt other than the debt secured by the lien and attaches or levies execution on the subject of the lien debt.
Missouri has specifically recognized the distinction between the first two
situations stated in the preceding paragraph. In Neff v. Rhodes1- the lienor sought
to enforce his lien as provided by statute and his levy of execution was levied
just prior to a levy of attachment by another unsecured creditor of the lience.
For some reason not stated in the report of the case, sale was had under the unsecured creditor's subsequent levy of execution and not under that of the lienor.
In an action of replevin by the lienor it was held that he had not lost possession
by his levy of execution and he should recover the stallion in question. The court
said, "In this case, the plaintiff was proceeding to enforce his lien as provided by
the statute. To say he lost it in such case, would be to hold that the statute gives
him a lien and points out to him how he shall enforce it, which, if he obeys, is
immediately lost to him." In discussing the authorities cited by the unsecured
creditor under whose execution sale was made and who was the purchaser at the
sale, the court said, "Authorities cited by appellants holding that the levy of an
execution discharges the lien, will be found on examination, to be exexcutions basei
,njudgments in suits independent of the lien, as if one having a lien should bring
an ordinary action on account, without reference to the lien." It is clear that the
court was holding that where the henor proceeded according to the statute10 in enforcing his lien, he should not lose his lien in case of any untoward circumstances.
14. Lambert v. Nicklass, 45 W. Va. 527, 31 S. E. 951, 44 L. R. A. 561; Am.
St. Re p. 828, 831 (1889), where the court said: To sustain this loss of lien we
must place it on one or the other of two ideas, . . . intentional waiver, or from

loss of possession. As to the first, authority is abundant to show that one will
not be held to waive a lien unless the intent be express or very plain and clear.
The presumption is always against it. Merely taking a new security does not. ...
And as to loss of lien by loss of possession. .

.

. Suppose, however, by reason

of non-residence or other cause, the innkeeper can sue out an attachment, why
shall he not do so? He is not thus waiving, but enforcing his lien. Why should
it be said that, when the officer levies on the property to enforce this lien, the
innkeeper loses his lien because he gives up possession, I cannot see. The
officer is his agent for this purpose. To say so is technical in the highest degree
and defeats justice." Accord: Arendale v. Morgan, cited supra note 11 Criticized
in 12 HARv. L. REv. 571 to the effect that "nothing is gained by saying that the
necessity of the lien-holder continuing in possession is technical since it is based
upon the fundamental conception of the nature of a lien."
15. Cited supra note 9.
16. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) Secs. 3581, 3587, 3588.
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And just as clearly the court was distinguishing that case from the one where the
lienor takes a personal judgment on the debt and levies execution on the property
subject to the lien. The court in its discussion ignores the technical question of
loss of possession by surrender to the constable or sheriff and decides the case on
what, for want of a better term, might be called the "equities" of the case.
In the principal case the third situation is presented to the Missouri courts.
The levy of execution and sale of two of the four hogs was on a personal judgment for rent, a debt unconnected with that for which the lien existed. We have
seen that the court held that such levy resulted in a loss of lien to that portion
levied upon. It does not appear however that any consideration was given as to
the nature of the action in so holding. As to loss of lien in this situation no
quarrel can be had. The technical argument of surrender of possession may be
graciously heard to prevail. There are not equities in the lienor's favor. As to the
lien debt he was clearly surrendering his lien in favor of his unsecured debt. He
was content henceforth to rely on the personal credit of the lienee. It might be
said that it is the same as if he permitted a third person to levy on the chattels
in his possession. He stands in the position of any levying creditor and his rights
with respect to the levy should be subject to all the pitfalls of such an action without recourse to his possessory lien.
However, with respect to the first two situations perhaps there are other
considerations which should be taken into account. Loss of lien in the first situation has as we have seen, been denied in Missouri. The Restatement of Security7
would permit the lienor to rely upon his possessory lien if his judgment lien is
avoided in the second situation, where the lienor obtains a personal judgment against
the lienee. That the rule of that section refers to a personal judgment is clear from
Comment (a) to that section. However, this is qualified in Sub-section (2), so
that if the chattel has been subsequently mortgaged by the lienee the judgment of
the lienor is inferior to the chattel mortgagee's lien. Section 58 involving the same
problem with respect to pledges furnishes some insight into the reasons for the
stand on this point. In Comment (a) to that Section it says ". . . Since the attachment involves a surrender of possesion there is a technical argument that the
pledge interest has been terminated by the lien of the attachment.... Inasmuch as
the pledgee's purpose is merely to enforce his security and no injury has been
done to the pledgor the rule of this Section permits the pledgee to retain his pledge
interest."
On the second point raised by the principal case, that if the subject of the
lien is divisible and only a portion thereof is attached or levied upon in execution, the lien for the whole debt attaches to the remaining portion, there seems to be
17. RESTATEMENT, SECUnrrY (1941) § 77 (1); "Where a lienor obtains a
judgment for the amount of his demand and levy is made upon the chattel upon
which the possessory lien exists, if the judgment lien is thereafter avoided, the lienor is entitled to the possession of the chattel, and the lien revives upon return of the
chattel."
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no authority directly in point, but this proposition is sustained by a great weight
of authority in analagous situations." This point has frequently arisen with respect to carrier's liens where the carrier has permitted the owner or consignee to
remove a portion of the goods without payment but retains the balance of the
shipment for the charges on the whole shipment. That the carrier loses the lien
upon the goods delivered up, but may retain the balance for the charges on the
whole is uniformly sustained on the ground that the lien attaches to each and
every portion of the shipment subject to it, and a pfirtial delivery does not discharge
the lien altogether or pro tanto.19 Inasmuch as the basis of the loss of lien on the
portion delivered up is loss of possession, the analogy would seem to be complete
where the levying lienor is deemed to have lost possession by the writ.
The effect of so holding is necessarily this: In any of the three situations
above-described the lienor could attach or levy upon only that portion of the
whole which is deemed necessary to satisfy, upon sale, the lien debt or an unsecured
debt (as in situation there and the instant case) and to retain possession of the
balance. If for any reason his attachment or levy of execution should be unavailing,
he would still have possession of the remainder and could continue to hold them
for the satisfaction of the lien debt. Undoubtedly this is a tremendous advantage to the lienor. At the same time this works no hardship on the lienee, and
allowing the lienor to surrender a portion without losing the lien on the whole operates to the lienee's advantage in those situations where he wishes to take a portion
for sale in order to derive sufficient funds to pay the lien debt and thus secure
the release of the balance of the chattels being held under the lien. This procedure
is eminently practical and promotes justice on all sides.
JAMES P. BROWN
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-WRONGFUL

CONFINEMENT IN INSANE ASYLUM

NOT A

DISABILITY TO TOLL STATUTE REQUIRING ACTION FOR MALPRACTICE TO BE BROUGHT

WITHIN Two YEARS AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES
Woodruff v. Shores'

In September, 1946, plaintiff was confined as an insane person, and later parolled to her husband. In August, 1944, she was declared to have been sane and
not a proper patient for commitment. In November 1944, the plaintiff instituted
this action against the defendant, the physician who signed the certificate of her
insanity, for alleged malpractice. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground

that the plaintiff's petition showed on its face that her action was barred by the two
18. Gould v. Hill, 43 Idaho 93, 251 P. 167 (1926); George R. Barse Livestock Commission Co. v. Adams, 2 Ind. T. 119, 48 S. W. 1023 (1889); Griffith
v. Speaks, 111 Ky. 149, 63 S. W. 465 (1901).
19- 10 C. J. § 728, p. 461 note 43; 13 C. J. S. § 331, p. 791; 1 JONES, LIENS
(2d ed. 1894) § 320, 411, 1001; RESTATEMENT,
1. 190 S. W. (2d) 994 (Mo. 1945).
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year statute of limitation set out in Section 1016, Missouri Revised Statutes (1939).
The question presented to the court was whether or not the plaintiff's commitment
or confinement, brought about by the defendant's certificate, disabled the plaintiff
from bringing her action under Section 1020,2 which provided in certain types
of disability for the bringing of the action within two years after the removal of
the disability. The court held that even if the plaintiff were disabled from instituting her action by her commitment and confinement and subsequent parol to
her husband as if she were actually insane, still since she was found to be in fact
sane, and since the legislature of Missouri did not broaden the language of the
excepting section to include a sane person, then the court of necessity must affirm
the lower court's decision dismissing the complaint.
Authority cited by the court for its conclusion was the case of Harnett v.
Fisher.3 In that case it was found that the defendant had not exercised reasonable care in examining the plaintiff, and that the plintiff was of sound mind
when he was confined as insane as a result of the defendant's certificate. The trial
court entered judgment for the defendant's certificate. The trial court entered
judgment for the defendant upon the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitation. In reviewing the case in the House of Lords, Viscount Sumner
said that the plaintiff could not be allowed to blow hot and cold, and say, for the
purpose of getting a verdict and damages, that he was sane all along, and yet, for
the purpose of meeting the plea of limitations, say that he must nevertheless be
deemed to have been insane so as to prevent time from running.
It should be noted, however, in answer to Viscount Sumner's argument that
it might equally be argued that there was inconsistency on the part of the defendant in such action, inasmuch as he had certified the plaintiff to be insane, and then in
the action, as a defense, asserted that the plaintiff was sane and not entitled to the
benefit of the provisions suspending the statute of limitations as to persons insane.
In an earlier Minnesota case4 to recover damages alleged to have resulted
from a conspiracy between the defendants in preferring a false charge of insanity
against the plaintiff and in securing an adjudication of insanity against her, the
action was barred by the statute of limitations which provided that such actions
must be commenced within two years after the cause accrued. In effect, the
court said that although insanity would suspend the period of limitations until the
disability was removed yet, since she was not insane during the period that she
was confined, she was not under a disability as intended in the statute, but even
if said confinement is disability within the meaning of the statute the action is still
2. Section 1020 of the MissouRi REvISED STATUTES (1939) sets out four
situations in which one entitled to a cause of action shall be at liberty to bring such
action within the respective times limited, after such disability is removed. These
are where plantiff is within the age of twenty one, insane, imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under sentence of a criminal court for a less term than
his natural life.
3. (1927) A. C. 573, 16 B. R. C. 238.
4. Langer v. Newmann, 100 Minn. 27, 110 N. W. 68 (1907).
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barred, for the statute also provides that in no case should the period be extended
for more than one year after the disability ceases.
It would appear therefore that the authorities which have passed on this point
favor the conclusion of the court in the principal case. Yet it cannot be denied that
on first thought a gross injustice seems to have been perpetrated upon the plaintiff.
At common law there were no fixed periods for the commencement of suits"
nevertheless pleas of limitations were allowed long before there were any statutes
on the subject. The courts applied them on the theory of a fiction to the effect
that after a long lapse of time, during which the claimant made no assertion of his
rights, in a personal demand, a presumption was raised that the obligation had
been paid or discharged, and in the case of real estate that the conveyance had
been executed but lost. 6 The fiction was justified in the reasoning of the court
by the evident justness of the effect.7
Thus it will be noted that a liberal construction of these limitations and the
first statutes of limitations 8 was adopted by the courts, the basis of their origin
being not arbitrarily to end certain actions at a given time, but rather the basis
was founded upon the general experience of mankind that claims which are not
usually allowed to remain neglected if the right to sue thereon exists. So if a valid
claim could still be established to overcome the presumption of no claim, then
the action was permitted. This is further emphasized by the fact that even under
the interpretation of the courts today statutes of limitation do not confer rights
of action, or discharge or pay debts; their only effect is to bar the remedy of action.
At one time considerable prejudice prevailed against statutes of limitation
and the courts were hostile to their enforcement 9 Statements are found in the
earlier cases to the effect that it was dishonorable to insist on the statutory defense
of the statute of limitations. Even courts of law resorted to a species of artifice to
exclude its operation, and the plea was sometime excluded under any slip of the attorney when any other plea would have been received.10
Under such an interpretation of the statute of limitations, together with a plea
of inconsistency in the defendant's defense as set out above, it might have been incumbent upon the court to reverse the ruling of the lower court dismissing the
5. Brooklyn Bank v. Barnaby, 197 N. Y. 210, 90 N. E. 834, 27 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 843 (1910); Cowhick v. Shingle, 5 Wyo. 87, 37 Pac. 689, 25 L. R. A.
608 (1894).
6. See 20 Am. Jir. 231. § 236.
7. Wells-Kahn Co. v. Klein, 81 Fla. 524, 88 So. 315 (1929); Union Cent.
Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks, 119 Ky. 261, 83 S. W. 615, (1904), overruled on another
point in Burlew v. Fidelity & Co. 276 Ky. 132, 122 S. W. (2) 990 (1938), 121
A. L. R. 751, 758 (1939).
8. HENRY VIII Chap. 2 (1540, limiting the time for the bringing of
suit upon a cause of action concerning real estate; 21 JAMES I, Chap. 16 (1623),
superseding 32 Henry VIII.
9. Tynan v. Walker, 35 Cal. 634 (1868); Regan v. Williams, 185 Mo. 620,
84 S. W. 959 (1905); Pritchard v. Howell, 1 Wisc. 118 (1853).
10. Ford v. Scholl, 110 Ore. 21; 221 Pac. 1052 (1924).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss1/10

32

1947]

et al.: Recent Cases
RECENT CASES

plaintiff's petition. However, it cannot be denied that the legislative policy has
become recognized as controlling and that it is the duty of the courts to give full
effect thereto.
EUGENE E. ANDERECK

TORTS-CAUSATION-SUICIDE

AS INTERVENING CAUSE

Jones v. Stewart'
In an action brought by the parents to recover for the death of a son, the
declaration alleged that the defendant accused their son, 18 years of age, of breaking in his house and stealing $70 to $75; that the accusation was false and made
without reasonable or probable cause for believing truth of same; that deceased
was so shocked and frightened with this charge of crime that it came to be more
than he could endure, and that as a consequence the boy hung himself; that before the suicide the deceased was greatly distressed. A demurrer to the declaration
was sustained on the basis that a cause of action was not stated. In affirming the
ruling of the lower court the Supreme Court of Tennessee stated "that no reasonable person would have expected" the suicide, that it could not have been foreseen, and that the death was the result of a deliberate act of the deceased.
The basis for denying recovery in a case of this type is that the suicide was
an intervening cause, relieving the defendant from liability. Suicide is generally
held to be an intervening cause if the deceased understood the physical consequences of his act and if he was not in an uncontrollable frenzy at the time.2 This
test was first applied in the early insurance cases in determining if the insured's
3
death resulted from suicide or by his own hand within the meaning of the policy.
It has been applied to negligence and workmen's compensation cases.In the application of the rule, however, the courts reach various results in determining if the manner of suicide indicates the deceased's knowledge of the physical
effects of his act.5 This is no doubt due to the inability to prove the statutes of the
1. 191 S. W. (2d) 439 (Tenn. 1946).
2. Brown v. American Steel and Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N. E.
80 (1909); Daniels v. New York N. H. & H. R. R., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424
(1903); Long v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. 108 Neb. 342, 187 N. W. 930 (1922),
Konazewska v. Erie R. R., 132 N. J. L. 424, 41 A. (2d) 130 (1945); Lupfer v.
Baldwin Locomotive Works, 269 Pa. 275, 112 Atl. 458 (1921), Arsnow v. Red
Top Cab Co., 159 Wash. 137 292 Pac. 436 (1930).
3. Daniels v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. 183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424
(1903).
4. Brown v. American Steel and Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N. E. 80
(1909), Jackson Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Slover, 102 Ind. Ap. 45, 199 N .E. 417
(1936); Daniels v. New York, N. H. K-H. R. R. 183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424
(1903); In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N. E 466 (1915).
5. Recovery denied: Brown v. American Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind App 560,
88 N. E. 80 (1909) (cutting throat); Daniels v. New York N. H. & H. R. R.,
183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424 (1903) (locking door and strangling); Long v
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deceased's mind, whether the act of suicide was caused by a mental defect or the
deceased's own volition. The court's decisions seem to rest upon other factors.,
The nature of the wrongful act of the defendant has a very significant bearing. If
it is a wilful act, particularly if of a heinous nature, the liability is extended. 7 The
presence of physical injury, its nature and seriousness, is considered. 8 No doubt
this is one reason for denying liability in the principal case. However, in workmen's compensation cases the courts are quite liberal in this respect.0 Perhaps the
most important factor is the type of liability imposed upon the defendant: whether
it is a personal liability or the result of a governmental plan as workmen's compensation.10
Although the same principle of causation is applicable to actions for negligence, wilful tort, under workmen's compensation statutes, and in criminal prosecutions,"' the above test is not always applied. The Restatement of Torts would
extend recovery in negligence actions to the case where the deceased was acting
under the influence of an uncontrollable impulse caused by insanity which insanity was caused by an act of the defendant, although he realized the nature and
consequences of his act.' 2 In convicting the defendant for murder when his raped
victim bought and took poison, the Indiana court relied upon the reasonable and
probable theory applicable to negligence actions.13 This was done even though
it appeared that the deceased was mentally responsible. In the application of their
workmen's compensation statutes, the English courts do not require the lack of
knowledge of the physical effect of the act or an uncontrollable frenzy. 14 It is only
necessary that the suicide be a result of insanity; the insanity a result of the injury received from the employment. Neither is the rule applied by several
Omaha & C. B. S. Ry. 108 Neb. 342, 187 N. W. 930 (1922) (buying shell and
shooting); Konazewska v. Erie R. Co., 132 N. J. L. 424, 41 A. (2d) 130 (1945)
(hanging in empty cellar); Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 159 Wash. 137, 292
Pac. 436 (1930) (shooting). Recovery allowed: Jackson Hill Coal & Coke Co. v.
Slover, 102 Ind. App. 145 199 N. E. 417 (1936) (shooting); In re Sponatski,
220 Mass. 526, 108 N. E. 466 (1915) (jump from window); Lupfer v. Baldwin
Locometive Works, 269 Pa. 275, 112 Ati. 458 (1921) (shooting while wife from
room); cf. Sinclair's Case, 248 Mass. 414, 143 N. E. 330 (1924) (starvation).
6. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs (1934) § 916.
7. Compare Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 179 N. E. 633 (1920) with
Brown v. American Steel and Wire Co., 43 Ind. Ap. 560, 88 N. E. 80 (19085.
8. Jackson Hill Coal and Coke Co. v. Slover, 102 Ind. Ap. 145, 199 N. E.
417 (1936) (disfiguring bums on head and body); lit re Sponatski, 220 Mass.
526, 108 N. E. 466 (1915) (molten lead in eye); Lupfer v. Baldwin Locomotive
Works, 269 Pa. 275, 112 Atl. 458 (1921) (severe electrical shock).
9. Wilder v. Russell Library Co. 107 Conn. 56, 139 At. 644 (1927) (excess
worry); Sinclair's Case, 248 Mass. 414, 143 N. E. 330 (1924) (strained spine).
10. No case has been found allowing recovery on personal liability basis.
11. Note (1932) 81 U. of PA. L. Rnv. 189.
12. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs (1934) § 455.
13. Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 179 N. E. 633 (1932).
14. Graham v. Christie, 10 BWCC (Scot) 486 (1916); Marriott v. Maltby
Main Colliary Co., 13 B. W. C. C. 354 (1920); also see Delinousha v. National
Biscuit Co., 248 N. Y. 93, 161 N. E. 431 (1928).
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of the state courts in allowing recovery under a civil damage statute.1 5 It is held
that the sale of liquor to the deceased during the drunken period is sufficient.
The liquor weakening the mind of the deceased and thereby proximately causing his
death. The rule was not considered in the pricipal case, but the liability of the
defendant was limited upon the reasonable and probable theory applicable to negligence actions.18
ALMON H. MAUS

15. Poffinbarger v. Smith, 27 Neb. 788, 43 N. W. 1150 (1889); Garrigan
v. Kennedy, 19 S. D. 11, 96 N. W. (1904).
16. Salsedo 89 v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 2d. 1921), 23 A. L. R. 1262.
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